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Gender, age, and culturally specific beliefs are often considered relevant to observed
variation in social interactions. At present, however, the scientific literature is mixed with
respect to the significance of these factors in guiding moral judgments. In this study,
we explore the role of each of these factors in moral judgment by presenting the results
of a web-based study of Eastern (i.e., Russia) and Western (i.e., USA, UK, Canada)
subjects, male and female, and young and old. Participants (n = 659) responded to
hypothetical moral scenarios describing situations where sacrificing one life resulted
in saving five others. Though men and women from both types of cultures judged
(1) harms caused by action as less permissible than harms caused by omission, (2)
means-based harms as less permissible than side-effects, and (3) harms caused by
contact as less permissible than by non-contact, men in both cultures delivered more
utilitarian judgments (save the five, sacrifice one) than women. Moreover, men from
Western cultures were more utilitarian than Russian men, with no differences observed
for women. In both cultures, older participants delivered less utilitarian judgments than
younger participants. These results suggest that certain core principles may mediate
moral judgments across different societies, implying some degree of universality, while
also allowing a limited range of variation due to sociocultural factors.
Keywords: morality, moral judgment, cross-cultural, individual differences, gender, age
INTRODUCTION
Social norms, both implicit and explicit, guide individual behavior. From early stages of
development and throughout life we learn to adapt our behavior according to social expectations
and requirements, which may differ across cultures and may be relevant in various degrees for
men and women of different ages. On the other hand, social and moral norms are part of every
human culture, with some indication that a set of core principles may underlie fundamental moral
judgments. On this view, some aspects of moral competence may be universal, part of the human
endowment (e.g., Dwyer, 1999; Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2011). In this study, we explore whether
cultural beliefs, gender and age impact moral judgments, and if so, how.
Morally relevant judgments and actions appear to be based on different cognitive processes
when compared with other rule-based social interactions such as conventional situations (Turiel,
1983; Huebner et al., 2010; FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Young and Dungan, 2012; Pascual et al., 2013).
While conventional rules may vary significantly across cultures and social groups, some moral
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principles are hypothesized to be unconsciously operative and,
to a significant extent, universal. On this view, these principles
are part of our core endowment as a species, what some have
referred to as our universal moral grammar (Rawls, 1971; Dwyer,
1999; Harman, 1999; Mikhail, 2000, 2007, 2011; Hauser, 2006,
etc.) The strong version of this thesis is that such principles are
largely immune to sociocultural influences. An alternative view is
that both moral judgments and actions are culturally constructed
through conscious and rational deliberation (Kohlberg, 1981,
1984). On this view, what is universal is limited to some sense
of right and wrong and some way of encouraging or supporting
morally appropriate actions while discouraging or punishing
morally inappropriate actions. It is up to each culture to decide
what is morally appropriate.
Understanding the nature and development of our moral
sense is complicated not only by the different theoretical
perspectives noted above, but because of different methodologies.
For example, some studies focus on moral judgments and others
on moral actions; some present hypothetical moral situations
and others real-world moral cases; and some test a narrow
range of subjects, mostly from Western developed nations, while
others sample small-scale societies. Our goal in this paper is
to focus on moral judgments, using a well-studied battery of
hypothetical moral dilemmas, while extending the analysis to
an Eastern culture, along with potential age and gender effects.
We begin by discussing some of the relevant literature, focusing
especially on the inconsistency of results with respect to the
contribution of gender, age, and cultural beliefs in guiding moral
judgments.
The Role of Gender
Gilligan (1977, 1982) initiated the debate about gender
differences in moral judgments in response to Kohlberg’s (1969)
original work on the problem. She suggested that because of
differences in early socialization, boys develop into independent
agents whose behavior is regulated by rights and duties. In
contrast, girls are more focused on their network of social
relationships, placing a greater emphasis on social responsibility
and care as opposed to justice. Although, Gilligan’s position
found little empirical support (Jaffee and Hyde, 2000), gender
differences in moral behavior can be found in other literatures.
For example, studies demonstrate that young boys lie more
often than young girls (Gervais et al., 2000). In adolescence,
boys violate moral rules, including harming other people,
more often than girls (Moffitt et al., 2001). Adult men are
involved in significantly more crime, associated with severe
moral violations, than women (e.g., Bennett et al., 2005). As
for moral judgments, however, results are mixed. In some
studies, men are less likely than women to support altruistic
actions in every-day scenarios (Rosen et al., 2016) and are
more likely to deliver utilitarian responses to hypothetical,
harm-based moral scenarios (Fumagalli et al., 2010; Youssef
et al., 2012; Friesdorf et al., 2015). In contrast, other studies
using similar scenarios and methodologies show that gender, as
well as several other cultural factors (age, political affiliation,
religious background), contribute very little to the pattern of
judgments observed (Hauser et al., 2007; Banerjee et al., 2010;
Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013). Lastly, fMRI data suggest that
even when delivering similar behavioral responses, there are
sex differences in neural processing (Harenski et al., 2008); this
result suggests that judgment data may hide underlying gender
differences, at least in some cases. In sum, though many studies
consistently show gender differences in moral action, the role
of gender in the formation of moral judgments is much less
clear.
The Role of Age
It has long been established that from an early age, children can
differentiate moral violations and conventional transgressions
(e.g., Smetana, 1983; Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Gasser and
Keller, 2009), and distinguish the same actions resulting in
different outcomes (e.g., Nelson, 1980) as well as actions with the
same outcome but different intentions (Armsby, 1971; Cushman
et al., 2013). What is less clear is whether and how patterns of
moral judgment change throughout life, in part because of the
variety of methods deployed.
In studies using hypothetical moral dilemmas involving
harm to others, most results show little to no change across
development. In a study of largely Western subjects, varying
in age from 10 to 87, individuals judged (1) harm caused
by action as worse than equivalent harm caused by omission
(action/omission); (2) harm intended as a means as worse
than harm foreseen as a side effect (means/side effect); and
(3) harm caused via physical contact as worse than harm
caused without contact (contact/non-contact; Cushman et al.,
2006; Hauser et al., 2009). Though there were no significant
age effects among this sample for these three distinctions or
principles, the majority of subjects were adults. In another study
focusing on different variants of the trolley problem, Hauser
et al. (2007) found that age predicted only 1.4% of the variance
in moral judgments; here as well, most subjects were adults.
Pellizzoni et al. (2009, 2010), showed that by the age of 4–
5 years old, children judge means-based harms as worse than
side effects, and contact as worse than non-contact. Adolescents
(14–18 year olds) apply all three principles in their moral
judgments like adults, but vary in their moral justifications (Stey
et al., 2013). These data support the idea that for hypothetical
moral dilemmas involving harm, intuitive moral judgments
appear early in development, and as a cognitive process, emerge
prior to deliberative, conscious justification, which develops
later along with other cognitive abilities, including language
skills.
Using different moral dilemmas and methodologies of
presentation, Pratt et al. (1987) found no age difference in
stage level of moral development and reported role-taking
on hypothetical moral dilemmas, but older individuals (60–
75 years old) reported more varied reflections on their personal
experience at solving moral dilemmas in real life. Chap (1986)
reported a significant difference between elderly and early
middle-aged individuals on a measure of spontaneous role taking
when assessing moral dilemmas, with the elderly making more
definitive moral judgments than younger adults, who tended
to reconcile various points of view represented in dilemmas.
Narvaez et al. (2011) showed that older individuals (60–82 years
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old) demonstrate an enhanced memory for morally charged
events as compared to non-moral events; they are also more
likely to apply moral background knowledge to understanding
presented events. Finally, in their recent study Rosen et al. (2016)
found that age significantly correlated with more altruistic moral
decisions.
Additional evidence of age differences in moral judgments
has emerged from neuroimaging studies. Harenski et al. (2012)
investigated the dynamics of brain activity during the evaluation
of images involving moral and non-moral transgressions. Results
showed that the patterns of activation varied across participants
of different age, from 13 to 53. Specifically, there was a significant
positive correlation between age and hemodynamic activity in
brain areas associated with mentalizing as well as emotional
and self-reflective processing. In addition, Decety et al. (2012)
showed that brain areas engaged in moral judgment become
more functionally coupled with age.
In sum, it is presently unclear whether and how moral
judgments may change during development, including especially
development in adolescence through adulthood. The primary
reason for this ambiguity is the diversity of approaches involved
in assessing this problem. Due in part to the consistency of results
for studies involving hypothetical, harm-based moral dilemmas,
and especially the lack of age effects, this study further explores
the role of age using the same methodology.
The Role of Cultural Beliefs and Norms
Social and even simple perceptual judgments vary cross-
culturally, including especially contrasts between East
and West (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001; Kitayama and Uskul,
2011). The key dimension relevant to such cross-cultural
comparisons is individualism versus collectivism (Triandis,
1995), or independence versus interdependence (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991). Western cultures prioritize independence and
individualistic values, such as self-promotion, self-expression,
and self-sustenance (e.g., Kitayama and Uskul, 2011). Eastern
cultures, in contrast, emphasize interdependence between
individuals and collectivistic values, such as social harmony,
duties, and relational attachment. Russian culture has distinctive
features that are typical of Eastern collectivism (Tower et al.,
1997; Matsumoto et al., 1998; Alexandrov and Alexandrova,
2009; Varnum et al., 2009; Grossmann and Varnum, 2011) and
may be of particular interest for cross-cultural comparisons of
moral judgments due to the fact that it is a large scale, developed
society, comparable to Western societies. At the same time it
is necessary to emphasize that each culture within the Western
and Eastern types has its distinctive features which may vary
significantly, therefore data obtained in the Russian population
cannot be directly generalized to other Eastern cultures, such as
China or Japan. However, such data may be useful in considering
common tendencies typical for collectivistic societies. For
example, in other studies Chinese participants are less utilitarian
than Western participants (e.g., Ahlenius and Tännsjö, 2012;
Gold et al., 2014). In case of the classical trolley problem moral
judgments varied in the USA (killing one to save five was
judged as permissible by 81% of respondents), Russia (63%)
and China (52%), suggesting that in general Eastern cultures
as compared to Western may be less utilitarian but in various
degrees.
In cross-cultural analyses, it is important to isolate which
particular factors lead to what is called “cultural differences.”
For example, in a series of studies using subjects responding
to morally salient scenarios presented on the internet, there
was virtually no impact of gender, age, religious background,
or political affiliation on moral judgments of hypothetical
harm-based scenarios (Hauser et al., 2007; Banerjee et al.,
2010). In particular, these cultural variables had no impact
on the three morally central distinctions mentioned above
(means-side effects, action-omission, and contact-noncontact).
However, the majority of subjects were from Western, English-
speaking countries, including the USA, Canada, UK, and Holland
(Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser, 2006; Hauser et al., 2009).
As noted above, individuals from a small-scale rural Mayan
population judged means-based harms as worse than harms
resulting from side-effects — paralleling both Western subjects as
well as a more educated urban Mayan population — but judged
action-based harms as comparable to omissions (Abarbanell and
Hauser, 2010). This difference in judgments for the action-
omission cases could be due to something particular about
Mayan culture or reflect differences that characterize all small-
scale societies, demonstrating that looking into different cultures
may provide insights into the nature of moral judgments.
For example, in a recent study of several small scale societies
(ranging from hunter-gatherers to horticulturalists), results
revealed considerable variation in the pattern of moral judgments
concerning scenarios emphasizing the role of intention (Barrett
et al., 2016). Based on these results, the authors conclude that
our current, modern emphasis on intentionality may reflect
a culturally evolved process as opposed to a system that is
part of our innate endowment. Given the different results and
methodologies, it is difficult to discern at present how, and
to what extent, cultural factors impact moral judgments and
actions.
This paper presents an in-depth analysis of data on moral
judgments collected in two web-based studies, one of Western
English-speaking countries (Cushman et al., 2006) and the
other of a Russian sample (Arutyunova et al., 2013). Our goal
was to examine whether gender, age and the East–West axis
have a significant impact on the nature of moral judgments
and if so, in what way. A strength of this analysis is that
because all subjects were tested using the same methodology
(i.e., web-based presentation, same controlled hypothetical
moral dilemmas involving harm, same judgment scales), any
differences are more likely to be due to the sociocultural factors
examined.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Men and women of different age, religious, educational,
occupational, and other demographic groups voluntarily
participated in an Internet-based study (Cushman et al., 2006;
Arutyunova et al., 2013). Of these subjects, we analyzed the
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data from 659 subjects who fully completed a demographic
questionnaire, provided judgments of permissibility for all
moral dilemmas, and correctly answered two control scenarios
intended to test attention and understanding of instructions.
The Russian sample included 89 male (16–69 years old,
M = 28, SD = 12) and 238 female (16–58 years old, M = 27,
SD = 10) participants. The Western English-speaking sample
included 191 male (10–85 years old, M = 37, SD = 15) and 141
female (14–66 years old, M = 38, SD = 14) participants. For the
analysis we divided the two samples into five age groups (Table 1):
10–19, 20–24, 25–34, 35–44, and 45–85 years old.
Experimental Procedure
Participants voluntarily logged onto the web-site
(moral.wjh.harvard.edu, for more details about experimental
design and procedures, see Cushman et al., 2006) where
they followed on-screen instructions to fill in a demographic
questionnaire with information on gender, age, religion,
education and political affiliation. They were next presented
with 32 moral scenarios (for content of original scenarios
in English and their translation into Russian, see Appendix
in Arutyunova et al., 2013) in a randomized order. Of these
scenarios, 30 involved a situation where a protagonist made a
choice to sacrifice one person in order to save five other people.
These scenarios comprised 18 controlled pairs differentiating (1)
actions versus omissions, (2) intended means versus foreseen
side-effects, and (3) contact versus no contact (see Cushman
et al., 2006; Hauser et al., 2009). The two remaining scenarios
served as controls, presented non-moral situations, and provided
one mechanism to assess whether participants understood the
instructions and were paying attention. An example of one of the
30 scenarios is as follows:
“Luke is operating the switch at a railroad station when he sees
an empty, out of control boxcar coming down the tracks. It is
moving so fast that anyone it hits will die immediately. The
boxcar is headed toward five repairmen on the track. If Luke
does nothing, the boxcar will hit the five repairmen on the track.
Luke can pull a lever redirecting the boxcar to an empty sidetrack.
However, pulling the lever will cause the switch to crush one other
repairman working on the switch, who will die immediately. Luke
decides to pull the lever.
Pulling the lever is: 1 (Forbidden) – 2 – 3 – 4 (Permissible) – 5 –
6 – 7 (Obligatory)”
Participants were instructed to read the scenarios and then
decide, using a seven-point Likert scale, how they would rate
the protagonist’s behavior. The scale was anchored on one end
by “forbidden” and at the opposite end by “obligatory,” with
“permissible” anchoring the mid-point of the scale.
Data Analysis
We analyzed moral judgments in relation to gender, age,
and culture (Russian versus Western). The analysis included
comparisons of the pairs of scenarios, moral permissibility ratings
(MPRs) and extreme judgments.
Eighteen controlled pairs of scenarios differentiating (1)
actions and omissions, (2) intended means and foreseen
side-effects, and (3) contact and no contact were compared with
paired-sample t-test, within subjects (see Cushman et al., 2006).
The MPRs (see Paxton et al., 2012 for similar analysis) were
calculated as a mean score across all 30 test scenarios within
each subject1; and were used to describe overall moral judgments
about all different types of harms included in this study (i.e., those
caused by action or omission, intended as means or foreseen as a
side effect, via physical contact or no contact). We intended to
see how the permissibility of utilitarian actions and omissions
in general was assessed within our groups. Prior to analyzing
the MPRs we calculated Chronbach’s alpha to ensure significant
reliability of responses across 30 scenarios in both, Russian and
Western samples.
Extreme judgments – the scores on the borders of the seven-
point scale – included utilitarian extreme (7= “Obligatory”) and
non-utilitarian, or deontological, extreme (1= “Forbidden”) and
were used as an additional variable to complement the MPR
analysis and show how the factors of gender, age, and culture
are reflected in response style when evaluating moral dilemmas.
We analyzed the number and percentages of these two types of
extreme moral judgments in different groups of participants.
We used IBM SPSS.20 for statistical analyses. Distributions
were tested for normality with Kolmagorov–Smirnov test.
1One reason we selected MPRs as a measure was to control for a response style
which has been shown to vary across cultures, with some groups (e.g., Asians)
prioritizing responses around the middle of a scale in a greater degree than others
(e.g., Americans), who choose extreme responses on the borders of a scale more
often (see Chen et al., 1995). Our previous work on moral judgments also showed
that Russian individuals overall make less extreme judgments than their Western
English-speaking counterparts (Arutyunova et al., 2013). Differences in response
style do not alter cross-cultural comparisons of averaged responses (Chen et al.,
1995).
TABLE 1 | Five age groups.
Age group Years old Description N Female bias, % Age, M (SD) Age, Med
Rus West Rus West Rus West Rus West
1 10–19 Adolescents and teenagers 93 38 72 37 17.6 (1.0) 16.9 (2.3) 18 17
2 20–24 Young adults 86 32 76 53 21.8 (1.3) 22.0 (1.6) 22 22.5
3 25–34 Adults 81 85 73 40 29.3 (3.0) 29.3 (2.8) 29 29
4 35–44 Middle age adults 40 68 80 35 38.9 (3.0) 39.4 (2.7) 39 39
5 45–85 Older adults 27 109 56 48 52.9 (6.1) 54.8 (7.2) 51 54
Rus, Russian sample; West, Western sample.
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Chronbach’s alpha was used to assess reliability. A univariate
general linear model (a three-way ANOVA) was used to
determine the role of the factors of gender, age, and culture.
Two groups were compared with independent t-test, or
alternatively with non-parametric Mann–Whitney tests. For
three or more groups, a one-way ANOVA was performed
followed by post hoc Bonferroni tests, or alternatively we used
non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis test followed by paired Mann–
Whitney comparisons. Leven’s test was used to check for
homogeneity of variance, and Welch statistic was calculated
additionally for groups with heterogeneous variances. In-group
comparisons were done with Wilcoxon tests. Jonckheere trend
test was used to study the dynamics of MPRs in different age
groups. Pearson’s correlation was used to establish association
between variables. The following estimates of effect size were
calculated: Cohen’s d with t-test; ω with ANOVA; association
coefficient (r) with non-parametric tests. Significance level at
p < 0.05.
RESULTS
First, we calculated Chronbach’s alpha for all 30 test scenarios and
showed that responses to these scenarios had strong reliability
in both Russian (Chronbach’s α = 0.93) and Western samples
(Chronbach’s α = 0.96). We next averaged all 30 responses given
by each subject into one single MPR value. Thus, MPRs were
calculated for each subject, and we used these values as general
indicators of moral permissibility of various harmful behaviors
toward one person resulting in a greater good of saving five other
people.
To analyze variance in MPRs in relation to the factors of
culture, gender and age group we used a univariate general linear
model (a three-way ANOVA). Results showed significant main
effects of all three factors (Table 2), culture [F1(1,658) = 24.023,
p < 0.001, ω = 0.048], gender [F2(1,658) = 16.218, p < 0.001,
ω = 0.039] and age group [F3(4,658) = 6.075, p < 0.001,
ω= 0.045]. The interaction of the factors was not significant (see
Table 2). As the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not
met [Leven’s test, F(3,655) = 8.04, p < 0.001], we additionally
performed a Welch ANOVA separately for each independent
variable and also received significant effects of culture [Welch
statistics (1,642.451) = 23.465, p < 0.001] and gender [Welch
statistics (1,511.885) = 32.881, p < 0.001]. Due to significant
cultural differences, the effect of age group was tested separately
for Russian and Western samples and results are reported below
(see Age Comparisons).
Three Moral Distinctions
Results on the three moral distinctions within the Western
and Russian samples were previously reported (see Cushman
et al., 2006; Arutyunova et al., 2013 correspondingly). Here,
however, we analyzed these data separately for the two genders.
Using within subjects t-test, we compared how men and women
from Russian and Western cultures judged harmful actions and
omissions within pairs of moral scenarios. As shown in Tables 3
and 4, male and female participants, from both cultures, tended
to judge as less permissible, (1) actions as opposed to omissions,
(2) means as opposed to side-effects, and (3) physical contact as
opposed to without contact. Such analyses were not performed
separately within different age groups because some of these
groups had an insufficient sample size.
Gender Comparisons
Overall, men delivered more utilitarian moral judgments
(harm one to save five) than women (Figure 1), in both
Russian [t(325) = 2.121, p = 0.036, d = 0.24] and Western
[t(329.271)= 4.435, p < 0.001, d = 0.49] cultures.
We next explored extreme judgments, those on the borders of
the scale (1 = “forbidden,” 7 = “obligatory”). Among Russians,
both men (Wilcoxon match pairs test, n = 89, T = 766.5,
Z= 2.79, p= 0.005, r= 0.21) and women (Wilcoxon match pairs
test, n = 238, T = 3896, Z = 6.53, p < 0.001, r = 0.30), were
more likely to select the “forbidden” end of the scale as opposed to
“obligatory.” Similarly, Western women were also more likely to
select “forbidden” than “obligatory” (Wilcoxon match pairs test,
n= 141, T = 1576.5, Z= 2.88, p= 0.004, r= 0.17); Western men
showed no such difference (Wilcoxon match pairs test, n = 191,
T = 4568.5, Z = 1.43, p= 0.15).
TABLE 2 | ANOVA results for the factors of culture, gender, and age group.
Source Type III sum of squares df Mean square F Significance
Corrected model 100.960 19 5.314 4.591 0.000
Intercept 7208.112 1 7208.112 6227.40 0.000
Culture 27.806 1 27.806 24.023 0.000
Gender 18.772 1 18.772 16.218 0.000
Age group 28.129 4 7.032 6.075 0.000
Culture ∗ Gender 2.494 1 2.494 2.154 0.143
Culture ∗ Age Group 4.443 4 1.111 0.960 0.429
Gender ∗ Age Group 3.940 4 0.985 0.851 0.493
Culture ∗ Gender ∗ Age group 9.386 4 2.347 2.027 0.089
Error 739.632 639 1.157
Total 11384.112 659
Corrected total 840.592 658
The bold values indicate those results that are statistically significant, at least at p < 0.05; all other p-values are not statistically significant.
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TABLE 3 | Differences in permissibility for pairs of moral scenarios in the Russian sample.
Male Female
Scenario pair Mean difference SD t(88) Effect size (d) p (two-tailed) Mean difference SD t(237) Effect size (d) p (two-tailed)
Inaction – action
Boxcar 0.92 2.01 4.33 0.46 0.000 1.02 1.69 9.31 0.60 0.000
Pond 1.43 1.78 7.55 0.80 0.000 1.51 1.85 12.61 0.82 0.000
Ship 0.33 3.01 1.02 0.11 0.310 0.03 2.75 0.17 0.01 0.869
Car 0.66 1.59 3.94 0.42 0.000 0.81 1.75 7.17 0.46 0.000
Boat 0.48 2.15 2.12 0.22 0.037 0.30 2.01 2.29 0.15 0.023
Switch 0.16 1.74 0.85 0.09 0.395 0.13 1.89 1.10 0.07 0.273
Side effect -means
Speedboat 0.35 1.58 2.08 0.22 0.041 0.59 1.40 6.47 0.42 0.000
Burning 1.24 1.69 6.89 0.73 0.000 1.34 1.83 11.31 0.73 0.000
Boxcar 0.83 1.96 4.01 0.43 0.000 0.82 1.60 7.93 0.51 0.000
Switch 0.28 1.60 1.65 0.18 0.102 0.25 1.50 2.55 0.17 0.011
Chemical 0.48 1.89 2.41 0.26 0.018 0.21 1.51 2.10 0.14 0.037
Shark 0.49 1.54 3.03 0.32 0.003 0.50 1.51 5.14 0.33 0.000
No contact -contact
Speedboat 0.99 1.55 6.02 0.64 0.000 0.79 1.47 8.26 0.54 0.000
Intended burning 0.56 1.63 3.25 0.34 0.002 0.41 1.61 3.90 0.25 0.000
Boxcar 0.80 1.44 5.23 0.55 0.000 0.76 1.40 8.42 0.55 0.000
Foreseen burning 0.79 1.74 4.28 0.45 0.000 0.50 1.56 4.94 0.32 0.000
Aquarium 0.12 1.47 0.79 0.08 0.429 0.22 1.30 2.59 0.17 0.010
Rubble 0.42 1.66 2.37 0.25 0.020 0.12 1.26 1.44 0.09 0.150
Significant differences are highlighted in a darker shade of gray. The bold values indicate those results that are statistically significant, at least at p < 0.05; all other p-values
are not statistically significant.
TABLE 4 | Differences in permissibility for pairs of moral scenarios in the Western sample.
Male Female
Scenario pair Mean difference SD t(190) Effect size (d) p (two-tailed) Mean difference SD t(140) Effect size (d) p (two-tailed)
Inaction – action
Boxcar 0.80 2.19 5.02 0.36 0.000 0.58 1.79 3.85 0.32 0.000
Pond 1.80 2.10 11.88 0.86 0.000 1.53 1.87 9.73 0.82 0.000
Ship 0.66 2.19 4.17 0.30 0.000 1.06 1.71 7.40 0.62 0.000
Car 1.01 1.79 7.79 0.56 0.000 0.75 1.74 5.13 0.43 0.000
Boat 1.05 1.94 7.48 0.54 0.000 0.87 2.03 5.09 0.43 0.000
Switch 0.35 1.98 2.45 0.18 0.015 0.14 1.71 0.99 0.08 0.326
Side effect -means
Speedboat 0.24 1.20 2.77 0.20 0.006 0.36 1.06 4.04 0.34 0.000
Burning 1.20 1.69 9.84 0.71 0.000 1.30 1.69 9.10 0.77 0.000
Boxcar 0.59 1.80 4.54 0.33 0.000 0.37 1.50 2.91 0.25 0.004
Switch 0.34 1.87 2.51 0.18 0.013 0.21 1.61 1.51 0.13 0.133
Chemical 0.25 1.58 2.15 0.16 0.032 0.23 1.41 1.97 0.17 0.051
Shark 0.16 1.73 1.30 0.09 0.195 0.50 1.81 3.25 0.27 0.001
No contact -contact
Speedboat 0.83 1.46 7.81 0.56 0.000 0.99 1.39 8.40 0.71 0.000
Intended burning 0.24 1.40 2.38 0.17 0.018 0.25 1.40 2.11 0.18 0.037
Boxcar 1.12 1.78 8.68 0.63 0.000 0.99 1.64 7.18 0.61 0.000
Foreseen burning 0.34 1.32 3.55 0.26 0.000 0.40 1.06 4.52 0.38 0.000
Aquarium 0.15 1.52 1.33 0.10 0.185 0.21 1.09 2.25 0.19 0.026
Rubble 0.09 1.25 0.99 0.07 0.325 0.12 1.31 1.09 0.09 0.277
Significant differences are highlighted in a darker shade of gray. The bold values indicate those results that are statistically significant, at least at p < 0.05; all other p-values
are not statistically significant.
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FIGURE 1 | Gender effects on moral judgments. Mean MPRs (±2 SE) are
shown for men and women in Russian (dark blue rows) and Western (light
blue rows) cultures. Men in both cultures delivered more utilitarian judgments.
Western men were more utilitarian than Russian men with no cultural
difference between women, t-test for independent samples, ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗p < 0.01.
Age Comparisons
Age was negatively correlated with MPRs in the Russian sample
(Pearson r =−0.23, p < 0.001; Spearman r =−0.28, p < 0.001),
suggesting that moral judgments become less utilitarian with age.
However, no significant correlation was found in the Western
sample (Pearson r = −0.04, p = 0.464; Spearman r = −0.11,
p= 0.055).
To analyze variances in MPRs in relation to age, we used a
univariate general linear model (a one-way ANOVA). Results
showed that the main effect of age was significant in the Russian
culture [F(4,322) = 5.360, p < 0.001, ω = 0.058], but not in
the Western culture [F3(4,327) = 1.301, p = 0.27]. Post hoc
Bonferroni tests (see Table 5) revealed that in the Russian culture,
responses of the youngest age group (16–19 years old) were
different from responses of the older age groups (25–69 years
old), but with no significant differences among the older age
groups.
As can be seen from Figure 2, mean MPR values decrease
with age, suggesting, to some extent, that in the transition from
teenager to adulthood, moral judgments become less utilitarian.
This trend is observed in both cultures, Russian (Jonckheere
trend test, p < 0.001) and Western (Jonckheere trend test,
p = 0.007). Mean MPRs were higher in the Western sample
within each of the five age groups [t-test for independent
samples, age group 1: t(129) = 1.978, p < 0.05, d = 0.35;
age group 2: t(116) = 2.402, p = 0.018, d = 0.45; age
group 3: t(157.317) = 3.923, p < 0.001, d = 0.63; age group
4: t(101.661) = 2.387, p = 0.019, d = 0.47; age group 5:
t(48.750)= 3.507, p < 0.001, d = 1.00].
The analysis of extreme judgments revealed that in both
cultures, the number of “Forbidden” responses was significantly
different across the five age groups (Kruskal–Wallis test, Russian
sample p < 0.001, Western sample p < 0.007). However, no
such difference was found in the case of “Obligatory” responses
TABLE 5 | Multiple comparisons of age groups in Russian culture (Bonferroni tests).
Age groups Mean difference Standard error p 95% confidence interval
Lower bound Upper bound
16–19 20–24 0.27706 0.14790 0.619 −0.1410 0.6951
25–34 0.51668∗ 0.15025 0.007 0.0920 0.9414
35–44 0.55998∗ 0.18693 0.030 0.0316 1.0883
45–69 0.78767∗ 0.21612 0.003 0.1768 1.3985
20–24 16–19 −0.27706 0.14790 0.619 −0.6951 0.1410
25–34 0.23962 0.15307 1.000 −0.1930 0.6723
35–44 0.28291 0.18921 1.000 −0.2519 0.8177
45–69 0.51061 0.21809 0.198 −0.1058 1.1271
25–34 16–19 −0.51668∗ 0.15025 0.007 −0.9414 −0.0920
20–24 −0.23962 0.15307 1.000 −0.6723 0.1930
35–44 0.04329 0.19105 1.000 −0.4967 0.5833
45–69 0.27099 0.21970 1.000 −0.3500 0.8920
35–44 16–19 −0.55998∗ 0.18693 0.030 −1.0883 −0.0316
20–24 −0.28291 0.18921 1.000 −0.8177 0.2519
25–34 −0.04329 0.19105 1.000 −0.5833 0.4967
45–69 0.22769 0.24624 1.000 −0.4683 0.9237
45–69 16–19 −0.78767∗ 0.21612 0.003 −1.3985 −0.1768
20–24 −0.51061 0.21809 0.198 −1.1271 0.1058
25–34 −0.27099 0.21970 1.000 −0.8920 0.3500
35–44 −0.22769 0.24624 1.000 −0.9237 0.4683
∗p < 0.05.
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FIGURE 2 | Decreasing utilitarian judgment in older age groups in
Russian and Western cultures. Mean MPRs with 95% confidence intervals
shown for five age groups: (1) 10–19, (2) 20–24, (3) 25–34, (4) 35–44, and (5)
45–85 years old. Significant age trends in Russian (Jonckheere trend test,
p < 0.001) and Western (Jonckheere trend test, p = 0.007) cultures. MPRs
were higher in the Western sample within all five age groups, t-test for
independent samples, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
(Kruskal–Wallis test, Russian sample p = 0.775, Western sample
p = 0.984). In the Russian sample, participants of all age
groups, apart from the youngest (16–19 year olds), used the non-
utilitarian end of the scale more often than utilitarian (Wilcoxon
matched pairs test, n1 = 93, T = 966.5, Z = 0.49, p = 0.623;
n2 = 86, T = 689.5, Z = 2.95, p = 0.003, r = 0.23; n3 = 81,
T = 326.5, Z = 5.17, p < 0.001, r = 0.41; n4 = 40, T = 54.5,
Z = 3.92, p < 0.001, r = 0.44; n5 = 27, T = 26.5, Z = 3.52,
p < 0.001, r = 0.48). In the Western sample, the youngest age
group responded “Obligatory” more often than “Forbidden”;
among the other age groups, however, there was no significant
difference in the two types of responses (Wilcoxon matched pairs
test, n1 = 38, T = 98, Z = 2.19, p < 0.03; n2 = 32, T = 150.5,
Z = 0.63, p = 0.53; n3 = 85, T = 843.5, Z = 0.313, p = 0.75;
n4 = 109, T = 1263, Z = 0.67, p = 0.50; n5 = 68, T = 571,
Z= 1.85, p= 0.06). However, there was a trend toward increasing
number of “Forbidden” responses among the older age groups
in both Russian (Figure 3, Jonckheere-Terpstra test, p < 0.001)
and Western (Figure 3, Jonckheere-Terpstra test, p < 0.001)
cultures.
Cultural Comparisons
In general, Western subjects provided more utilitarian judgments
than Russian subjects [t(642.451) = 4.844, p < 0.001, d = 0.38].
However, the effect of culture was gender-specific (see Figure 1;
Table 6): Western men delivered more utilitarian judgments
TABLE 6 | Descriptive statistics of MPRs for gender and culture groups.
Culture Gender Mean SE 95% confidence interval
Lower bound Upper bound
Russian Male 3.982 0.116 3.755 4.210
Female 3.716 0.071 3.577 3.856
Western Male 4.443 0.079 4.288 4.598
Female 3.889 0.092 3.708 4.070
FIGURE 3 | Extreme judgments of “Forbidden” and “Obligatory” in five age groups. Medians are shown with 95% confidence intervals for five age groups:
(1) 10–19, (2) 20–24, (3) 25–34, (4) 35–44, and (5) 45–85 years old. An age trend toward increasing proportion of responses “Forbidden” is shown for both, Russian
(left graph, Jonckheere-Terpstra test, p < 0.001) and Western (right graph, Jonckheere-Terpstra test, p < 0.001) samples.
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FIGURE 4 | Scatterplots showing the relationship between MPRs and age of participants in Russian and Western samples. Western sample had a
greater variance in age groups over 25 years old (Leven’s test, age group 3: F = 6.736, p = 0.01; age group 4: F = 5.685, p = 0.019; age group 5: F = 3.987,
p = 0.048).
than Russian men [t(278) = 2.91, p = 0.004, d = 0.35], but
there was no difference in women’s responses [t(377) = 1.66,
p= 0.1].
Russian and Western samples overall had different variances
(Figure 4, Leven’s test, F = 10.753, p < 0.001) with a greater
variance in Western sample. However, analyses of each age group
revealed different variances within groups 3, 4, and 5 (from
25 years and older; Leven’s test, age group 3: F = 6.736, p= 0.01;
age group 4: F = 5.685, p = 0.019; age group 5: F = 3.987,
p= 0.048) but not within groups 1 or 2 (10–24 years old; Leven’s
test, age group 1: F = 0.088, p = 0.767; age group 2: F = 0.316,
p= 0.575).
Russian men, as compared to Western men, more often
responded “forbidden” (Mann–Whitney U-test, n1 = 89,
n2 = 191, U = 7077, Z = 2.33, p = 0.02, r = 0.14) and less often
“obligatory” (U = 6626.5, Z = 3.05, p= 0.002, r = 0.18). Russian
women were more likely to select “forbidden” than Western
women (n1 = 238, n2 = 141, U = 13791, Z = 2.95, p = 0.004,
r = 0.15), but no differences were observed for “obligatory”
(U = 16753, Z = 0.03, p= 0.98).
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to explore the role of gender and
age in the formation of moral judgments in two different
cultures, Russian and Western. In brief, our results show both
that there are principles that hold across sociocultural groups,
supporting the universality thesis, and that gender, age and the
East–West axis can account for some of the variance around
these principles. Below, we discuss these findings and their
implications for current debates about the nature of moral
competence.
Universal Moral Principles?
This study expands the cross-cultural evidence for universality
of three principles of harm by showing that men and women, of
different age groups, and from both Russian and Western cultures
perceive that (1) means-based harms are worse than foreseen side
effects, (2) actions leading to harm are worse than omissions,
and (3) harm involving physical contact is worse than harm
not involving contact. These results are consistent with the view
that some moral principles cut across significant sociocultural
variation in expressed moral judgments.
The universality claim, in its broadest sense, is the idea that
certain aspects of human thought are part of our endowment, and
thus species-typical. This claim does not imply that such cognitive
processes are invariable in their expression. Rather, the claim
is that such processes will appear in most cultures in a similar
fashion, and with both predictable and constrained variability.
Thus, language, music, violence, and cooperation appear in every
culture, but how they are expressed varies to some extent among
cultures.
Previous work, using a well-controlled battery of moral
dilemmas and a web-based methodology, revealed that subjects’
moral judgments of harm are mediated by the three moral
principles, irrespective of whether they are from a heterogeneous
Western population (e.g., USA, UK, Canada, Australia, Dutch,
urban-educated Mayan; Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser et al.,
2009; Abarbanell and Hauser, 2010) or Russian population
(Arutyunova et al., 2013). Similarly, Barrett et al.’ (2016) study of
small scale societies shows that intentionality plays a significant
role in most moral judgments, but with some variation in the
magnitude of its impact. However, Barrett et al. (2016) tend to
characterize the universality claim about intentionality as one
in which exceptions are deflating. That is, if any exception is
uncovered, the universality thesis is defeated. In contrast, our
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perspective on universality is that some sociocultural variance
is expected, but should be constrained and predictable, once
the system is well-understood. Comparing moral judgment with
language, one can observe that our linguistic competence is
universal and provides us with an ability to comprehend and
generate linguistic expressions which are partially shaped by
linguistic input. Hierarchical structure is part of all languages, but
the arrangement of linguistic elements within each language may
differ within limits. Thus, the seemingly universal mechanisms of
moral judgment do not eliminate variation, but rather allow for a
limited range of it, which we explore next.
Sociocultural Variation of Moral
Judgments
In this study we explored three sociocultural dimensions which
may influence moral judgment. It has been shown that all three –
gender, age and type of culture – have a significant effect on how
individuals judge various harmful actions toward one individual
which result in saving five other people. Particularly, we showed
that in both Russian and Western cultures, men delivered more
utilitarian judgments than women; and that utilitarian judgments
decrease with age in Russian culture with a similar trend in
Western culture. Moreover, the observed cultural variation was
gender-specific with no differences in women’s responses, while
Western men delivered more utilitarian judgments than Russian
men. We next explore potential explanations for these patterns.
Gender Differences
The results of this work are consistent with prior studies showing
that in hypothetical moral dilemmas involving harm, men are
more likely than women to judge as permissible sacrificing one
life to save many more (Fumagalli et al., 2010; Youssef et al., 2012;
Friesdorf et al., 2015). In their recent work, Friesdorf et al. (2015)
pointed out that they only found one study directly examining the
effect of gender on moral judgments (Italian sample, Fumagalli
et al., 2010). The work presented here extends this cross-cultural
evidence showing that among Russians, men are more likely to
provide utilitarian moral judgments than women.
A number of studies demonstrate that utilitarian decisions
are associated with (1) more rational, deliberative cognitive
processes and (2) reduced emotion and empathy. For example,
cognitive load makes people more utilitarian and increases their
response time (Greene et al., 2008); higher scores on cognitive
reflection task performed prior to solving moral dilemmas
correlate with utilitarian decisions (Paxton et al., 2012). At the
same time, individuals with reduced empathy and impaired
social emotions, such as patients with ventromedial prefrontal
damage (Koenigs et al., 2007) and those suffering from trait
alexithymia (Patil and Silani, 2014), are also more likely to
deliver utilitarian judgments. Similarly, psychopaths, who show
normal overall patterns of moral judgments (Cima et al., 2010),
generate more utilitarian decisions in cases of non-personal
moral dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2012). Healthy individuals
with reduced empathetic concern also deliver more utilitarian
moral judgments (Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013). Moreover,
higher levels of emotional arousal measured via electrodermal
activity of skin conductance are associated with a decreased
likelihood of utilitarian-biased moral behavior (Navarrete et al.,
2011). Enhanced emotional responses by means of serotonin
administration also make people less utilitarian when they judge
highly emotional personal moral dilemmas (Crockett et al.,
2010).
Thus, one possible explanation for our results may be rooted
in gender differences in emotion, including perhaps especially,
empathy. In particular, our results suggest that men may respond
with less empathy toward the individuals in the scenarios, thereby
enabling a more “calculated” utilitarian judgment. Consistent
with this interpretation is evidence that women report stronger
emotional responses (Allen and Haccoun, 1976; Grossman
and Wood, 1993; Brody and Hall, 2000; Chaplin, 2015) and
greater empathetic concern (e.g., Davis, 1983; Eisenberg and
Lennon, 1983; Rueckert and Naybar, 2008) than men. In a
meta-analytic study applying a process dissociation method to
moral judgments, Friesdorf et al. (2015) argued that a gender
difference in utilitarian responses is small compared to a much
stronger difference in deontological responses. The authors point
out that their results correspond to the data demonstrating
strong gender differences in affective processing with little gender
difference in cognitive processing. Thus, according to Friesdorf
et al. (2015), gender differences in moral judgments (i.e., the
greater utilitarian judgment in men) may be accounted for
by differences in emotional as opposed to controlled cognitive
processing.
Gender differences in emotional development are considered
as one of the factors underlying the formation of gender-
specific behaviors (Brody, 1985). Emotions are viewed as part of
socialization resulting in development of different social roles for
men and women (e.g., Eagly and Wood, 1991; Grossman and
Wood, 1993; Brody and Hall, 2000). “Traditionally, in Western
industrial societies women are more likely than men to have
domestic and nurturing roles, in which taking emotional care of
others is their main task” (Fischer et al., 2004, p. 87). Moreover,
“women are more likely than men to fill caretaker roles. . .
when employed for pay (e.g., teacher and nurse)” (Grossman
and Wood, 1993, p. 1010). Gilligan (1982) was the first to
point out the difference in the processes of socialization of
boys and girls which could cause variation in moral judgments.
Although, Gilligan’s position found little support in the studies
of moral development using Kohlberg’s experimental paradigm
(Jaffee and Hyde, 2000), methodological differences alone may
account for the differences reported here and elsewhere for
weaker emphasis on utilitarianism as a guiding principle for
moral judgments.
As previously mentioned, women report greater emotionality
than men, especially in terms of interpersonal expression (Allen
and Haccoun, 1976). As others have suggested, the interpersonal
dimension is important for women who use communication to
establish and enhance social connections and create relationships
(Gilligan, 1982; Eagly, 1987). Men, in contrast, value their
independence, aiming to achieve individual goals and pursue
dominance. In studies of personality traits, women show a greater
tendency to trust, are more likely to emotionally invest and
affiliate with others, be respectful, and avoid taking advantage
of them (Feingold, 1994; Costa et al., 2001; Weisberg et al.,
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2011). Moreover, these gender differences appear across different
cultures, including traditional cultures, with some variation:
in Western individualistic countries (Europe and USA) the
magnitudes of gender differences were more pronounced (Costa
et al., 2001). Women tend to need social support more than men
(Tamres et al., 2002). In the context of evaluating hypothetical
moral dilemmas, women are more likely to take the perspectives
of more than one character while men are more likely to
report taking the observer role (Pratt et al., 1987). The high
importance of interpersonal relations for women is also reflected
in their reporting greater empathetic concern, the ability to
perceive and understand the feelings and emotions of other
people (e.g., Davis, 1983; Eisenberg and Lennon, 1983; Rueckert
and Naybar, 2008). Rosen et al. (2016) showed that women
not only exceed men in emotional empathy but also make
more altruistic moral decisions which are mediated by emotional
empathy. Fumagalli et al. (2010) argued that women may be less
likely to favor utilitarian outcomes than men because they are
more empathic. In Harenski et al.’ (2008) fMRI study, women
exhibited stronger modulatory relationships between activity in
emotion and empathy-related brain areas [posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC) and insula] while generating moral judgments.
Men, in contrast, showed a stronger modulatory activity in
inferior parietal cortex which the authors related to processing
difficult contextual information.
Thus, in the case of harm-based moral dilemmas, women
may perceive the interpersonal aspect of situations with greater
emotions and empathy than men, which results in their rejection
of harming one to save many. Men, in contrast, are more likely
to see the same dilemma through the lens of quantifiable benefits,
and thus tilt their judgments toward the “calculated” utilitarian
outcomes.
Age Variation
In parallel with our comments on gender differences, one also
expects variation over development even in situations where the
underlying processes are universal. Decades of work on language
acquisition support this position (Pinker, 1994; Yang, 2006). In
the case of age, however, a significant component of the variation
will be due to changes in systems outside the core competence,
such as maturation of motor and sensory systems, together
with gradual and slow changes in executive mechanisms (e.g.,
attention, working memory, self-control). Thus, age variation is
expected, but the question is what kind of variation and why. The
analyses presented here add to current discussions about the role
of age in patterns of moral judgments.
The analysis of moral judgments across different age groups
revealed similar trends within both Russian and Western
cultures: the older the age group of participants, the less
utilitarian judgments they expressed, and the more they used
the non-utilitarian end of the scale (“forbidden”). These results
suggest that as men and women mature they tend to judge
utilitarian outcomes as less permissible.
Studies of adult development demonstrate an increase in
emotional and cognitive reactivity to socially important issues.
For example, interpersonal matters are more emotionally
salient in older adulthood (Blanchard-Fields et al., 1995, 2007).
Particularly, in situations involving social and personal loss
and eliciting sadness, self-reported, and physiological emotional
responding is higher in older adults relative to younger and
middle-aged adults (Kunzmann and Gruhn, 2005; Kliegel et al.,
2007; Seider et al., 2011). In general, older adults tend to
prioritize positive affiliative emotions (Carstensen, 2006), for
example when processing interpersonal information such as
facial expressions (Mienaltowski et al., 2011). Socioemotional
selectivity theory suggests that in the second half of life individual
motivation is shifting from future-oriented individual goals
toward social and emotional aspects of life (Carstensen et al.,
2003; Carstensen, 2006). These data on enhancing reactivity
within the affiliative emotional domain during lifespan may
be related to a greater empathetic concern for other people.
Sze et al. (2012) found that emotional empathy and prosocial
behavior increase with age. Moreover age-related increases in
prosocial behavior were partially accounted for by an increase
of empathic concern. In line with these results, Rosen et al.
(2016) showed that altruistic moral decisions also increase with
age and this increase is mediated by emotional empathy. As
discussed previously, enhanced emotions and empathy correlate
with decreased utilitarian moral judgments.
Harenski et al. (2012) investigated patterns of brain
activity while evaluating the severity of moral and non-
moral transgressions in a population of participants with an age
range from 13 to 53. At a behavioral level, there were no age
effects. However, positive significant correlations were observed
between age and activity in temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) as
well as age and activity in PCC. Several studies have suggested
that the TPJ is involved in theory of mind processing (e.g., Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Decety and Lamm, 2007), and plays a
significant role in moral judgments (e.g., Young et al., 2010;
Koster-Hale et al., 2013). In contrast, the PCC plays a significant
role in emotional and self-reflective processing. Harenski et al.
(2012) also noticed that the PCC activity increased in young
adults as compared to adolescents, while TPJ activity increased
later in adulthood, suggesting that the brain areas engaged in
moral judgment changed during individual development and
throughout life. Results of another fMRI study by Decety et al.
(2012, p. 218) support the view that moral judgment requires
“a complex integration between emotion and cognition that
gradually changes with age.” A gradual decrease in activity
of brain structures associated with emotion (amygdala and
insula) in older individuals was accompanied by an increase
in activity of cortical areas that have strong connections with
amygdala and insula and involved in decision making (medial
and ventral prefrontal cortex); these brain structures become
more functionally coupled with age.
Several authors have suggested, based on both neurobiological
and behavioral data, that normal lifespan development is
associated with strengthening the interconnections between
emotional, cognitive and behavioral domains which creates
the grounds for greater empathy and more complex emotions
(Magai, 2008). For example, Charles (2005) showed that
emotional responding becomes more heterogeneous in older
age. In situations involving injustice, older individuals often
experience several different emotions at the same time while
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younger individuals are more likely to report a single primary
emotion. Moreover, greater heterogeneity of emotions was
shown to be related to a greater number of life experiences.
Studies of clinical populations, including especially individuals
on the autistic spectrum, reveal that lack of connectivity
between key social-emotional mechanisms helps to explain
the deficits (Uddin et al., 2013). In our opinion, the trend
of decreasing utilitarian moral judgments with age found in
our study, along with increased emotional responding and
heterogeneity of emotions, socioemotional motivation, empathy,
and prosocial behavior shown in other studies, may reflect
developmental processes of accumulation of experience of
social interactions throughout the lifespan. Several authors
point out a significant increase in sociocultural experience
and accumulated knowledge of the world associated with
adult development (e.g., Baltes, 1987, 1993, 1997; Schaie,
1996; Kaufman and Lichtenberger, 2002). Experience in solving
interpersonal problems accumulates throughout life (Heidrich
and Denney, 1994) and older adults are more effective in solving
interpersonal problems than younger adults (Blanchard-Fields
et al., 2007). Thus, lifespan development may be associated
with an increase in emotional and empathetic involvement in
situations with interpersonal context, which in case of our moral
dilemmas results in judging harming a person as less permissible,
even when such actions bring an outcome of saving more
people.
Cultural Differences
Looking into different cultures may provide insights into the
relative plasticity of our moral judgments. In this study we
showed that moral judgments of Western English-speaking
individuals, in general, were more utilitarian than moral
judgments of Russian individuals, i.e., Russian participants rated
less permissible harming one person in order to save five others.
These results correspond to the data obtained in other Eastern
cultures, e.g., Chinese participants provide less utilitarian moral
responses than American (Ahlenius and Tännsjö, 2012) and
British (Gold et al., 2014); Korean participants when responding
to moral dilemmas in their own language were shown to deliver
no utilitarian choices at all (Costa et al., 2014). Therefore these
results may reflect the general tendency of individuals from
collectivistic cultures.
However, we also showed that such overall cultural difference
was due to more utilitarian judgments of Western men as
compared to Russian men while no cultural difference was
observed in women. Thus, the difference in utility of moral
judgment between the cultures was only true for one gender. As
mentioned before, utilitarian judgment correlates with reduced
emotion and empathy. Fischer et al. (2004) analyzed cross-
cultural variability of gender differences in emotion across
countries with different gender roles. They used the Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM) which reflects how actively
women take part in economic and political life: the higher
the GEM score, the more status and power women have in a
particular country. The GEM score is also related to the type
of culture: high GEM scores are mostly observed in Western
European and English-speaking countries (see Fischer et al., 2004;
United Nations Development Programme Human Development
Report, 2008 for a list of GEM ratings for each county)
with individualistic independent social orientation (e.g., Nisbett
et al., 2001)2. Fischer et al. (2004) showed that respondents in
countries with high GEM scores rated their powerless emotions
(including affiliative emotions, such as sadness, guilt, and shame)
as less intense than respondents in countries with low GEM
scores. Moreover, women’s ratings of intensity of emotions were
independent of their country’s GEM score and, similar to our
study, this overall cross-cultural difference was due to variation
in responses of men.
Restrictive emotionality in men is a typical Western
phenomenon (Jansz, 2000; Fischer et al., 2004). In Western
individualistic cultures, where an emphasis is made on the
values of independence and autonomy (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001),
men are commonly competition-focused, a perspective that
discourages powerless emotions, including affiliative emotions
related to empathy (sadness, guilt, shame). Women, in contrast,
are encouraged to express such emotions in order to successfully
maintain social relations and fulfill their social roles. Collectivistic
cultures emphasize the interdependence of individuals within a
group with a special attention payed to the context of social
situations, including group hierarchy (see in Nisbett et al., 2001;
Fischer et al., 2004). In collectivistic countries cultural display of
emotions is often similar for men and women so that “cultural
norms override gender role norms” (Fischer and Manstead, 2000,
p. 78). This corresponds to the previously mentioned results from
Costa et al.’ (2001) study in which typical gender differences in
personality traits appear across different cultures, but in Western
individualistic countries these differences are more pronounced.
Fischer and Manstead (2000) found that intensity and
duration of emotions was greater in collectivistic countries than
in individualistic countries. These results are in line with our
data on Russian men and women who were more likely to use
the non-utilitarian end of the scale as compared with Western
individuals. These results imply that when judging harm-based
moral dilemmas, Russian individuals may experience more
intense affiliative emotions and consider the situation from a
more interpersonal perspective than Western individuals.
Taken together with the data on cross-cultural differences in
social orientation (individualism/collectivism) and intensity of
reported emotions, our results suggest that cultural differences
may have a greater impact on men than on women. Supposing
that women generally experience stronger affiliative emotions
and are more empathetic than men (see Gender Differences),
their moral responses may be less prone to cultural variation
associated with the rational cognitive domain underlying
deliberation, such as moral reasoning.
As shown in Figure 4, there was greater variation among
Western than Russian respondents, but only for the older adults
(over 25 years old). This cross-cultural difference can potentially
be explained by different processes of cultural socialization. While
Western individualistic cultures prioritize personal independent
2Russian Federation scored 71th in the GEM rating in United Nations
Development Programme Human Development Report (2008). USA, UK, and
Canada scored 15th, 14th, and 10th, respectively. Russian culture also has
important features of the Eastern collectivist type of cultures (see Introduction).
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opinions, Eastern collectivistic cultures encourage individuals
to decide in a manner that is best for the group and often
involves compromises (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001). This particular
aspect of collectivistic cultures may account for the higher rate
of conformity, the tendency to match one’s beliefs and behaviors
to group norms (for a review and meta-analysis, see Bond
and Smith, 1996). The lower level of variation may be the
result of cultural socialization, which becomes more pronounced
in adulthood. On the other hand, given that the Western
sample included participants from several different countries,
differences in variance could also be accounted for by the higher
heterogeneity among Western respondents. We think this is less
likely as the majority of respondents were from the USA, UK and
Canada, which are certainly more similar than either country is
to Russia.
CONCLUSION
The results of the current study support the universality thesis
while revealing how different factors can generate predictable
patterns of variation. In particular, though Russian and
Western respondents’ judgments are consistent with the three
morally relevant principles developed by Cushman et al. (2006;
action-omission, means-side effects and contact-non contact
distinctions), gender, age, and the East–West axis directly impact
the range and pattern of variance. In both, Russian and Western
cultures moral judgments were more utilitarian in men than in
women with a decreasing age trend. These results are consistent
with the data on the role of emotion and empathy in social
judgment and, in our opinion, reflect the general and gender-
specific characteristics of the processes of cultural socialization
during individual development.
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